The main challenge of understanding Sharia in the West is its undefined nature. This contradicts the ease with which the term is used in public and political discourse, but also in the legal domain, which prides itself on its precision in terminology. This article addresses the question: What is the Sharia that Muslims in the West practice? To this end, a model is presented that provides tools to describe the complex interaction between Sharia, as practiced by Western Muslims, and their Western environment, and elucidates the ongoing dialectic of this interaction. The model further shows how Western Muslims adopt and adapt Sharia by manoeuvring between their specific needs in the Western context and the conditions set by that context. From a Western perspective, the model shows that issues of Sharia are usually discussed in legal terms, while most controversies are not legal but cultural in nature.
Introduction
In this article, I propose a conceptual legal-anthropological approach to the notion of "Sharia in the West." Although the term "Sharia" is widely used in the West, it is rife with contradiction and confusion. For example, in 2003 , the European Court of Human Rights ruled that "Sharia clearly diverges from 238 generosity practiced by many other Muslims. We find similar contradictions in the centuries-old classical legal scholarship that is also called Sharia, and that has produced a vast volume of literature with a multitude of interpretations. Given these conflicting manifestations of Sharia, it is striking that in public, legal, and political discourse, both Muslims and non-Muslims see so little need in explaining the term, but keep referring to it with self-evident assurance.
By contrast, in academic circles one finds more nuanced definitions of Sharia. But whereas the notion of "Sharia in the West" is gradually becoming a field of research in its own right, comprehensive characterizations of what this notion entails are absent. This has to do with the different disciplinary and geographic approaches that are applied to the subject. For instance, Sharia in the West is often studied from the point of view of the effects that contemporary practices and laws of Muslim majority countries may have in Western societies, some scholars focusing on the practices in these countries,5 others studying the ways in which these foreign Sharia laws are applied in Western courts through international private law.6 This approach has its relevance, but it fails to address the domestic and autonomous practices of Sharia by Muslims in the West. Research on this topic is gradually emerging, but is still scant and dispersed over various domains of interest. The domain that receives the most academic attention is Islamic family law, either as it is practiced by Muslims (this domain is still little researched),7 or as it is manifest in the so-called of Sharia in the West is therefore fragmented qualitatively (the interpretations and manifestations of Sharia) and almost absent quantitatively (the practices of Sharia, and the number of Muslims adhering to them). The different approaches to Sharia in the West and its manifestations warrant a comprehensive consideration. To do so, I expound a legal-anthropological model that can be used to reach an integrated understanding of this complex notion. The two basic questions I address when speaking of Sharia in the West are "What are we talking about?" and "What should we be talking about?" Sharia in the West, which has become a standard expression in practice as well as in academia, will serve as our central point of reference. The construction of this model therefore, involves the reconsideration of several basic notions: What is law? What makes a rule Islamic? What do we mean by "the West" and Western values? We must also take into account the interaction between Sharia and the Western legal and societal structures in which it is embedded. This dimension is crucial to our understanding of Sharia in the West, because there is a continuous dialectic going on between the different ways in which Sharia is practiced and interpreted by Muslims in the West, and the various Western responses to these practices and interpretations.11
Below I present the step-by-step construction of this model of Sharia in the West, in three parts. In the first part I address the notion of Sharia, with emphasis on what Muslims in Western societies do and want with respect to Sharia. I review the manners in which Sharia is being applied by Western Muslims, and the domains in which they do so, which in many instances are particular to a Western context. In the second part I discuss the Western environment in which this Sharia operates, and the Western responses to Sharia. Analysis of these responses shows that they can be divided into two categories, politicallegal and religious-cultural. In the third part I demonstrate that Sharia in the West is not a mere injection of a fossilized and alien legal system into Western societies, but the result of a dialectic between the two, which is still in a process of development.
11
This dialectic has been an important part of my research; see, e.g., "The Part i Sharia 1
Representations of Sharia
The main challenge in understanding what Sharia entails is that it is not a singular notion, nor a code of law contained in a corpus of legal rules. In the modern Muslim world, it survives in three forms: as scholarship, as a set of rules inserted into the modern legal system, and as a slogan. I briefly consider each of these representations to explain their relevance to our discussion of Sharia in the West.
1.1
Classical Legal Scholarship Islamic classical legal scholarship, that is, the scholarship developed in the early centuries of Islam and which is part of Islamic orthodoxy, is not preoccupied with the production of rules, as is the case, for instance, in canon law, but with the science of finding and interpreting rules.12 Over the centuries, this scholarship has yielded a massive volume of literature comprising a host of rules and interpretations. The fact that many of these interpretations differ from one another is not considered problematic from the Islamic scholarly point of view, because the essence of this scholarship is that one makes a serious intellectual effort (ijtihad) to come to a solution, thereby allowing for different scholars to have different opinions.
Islamic legal scholarship defined two areas in which human relations are expressed: one between man and God (ibadat), the other between man and man (mu'amalat). The first category comprises actions like prayer, fasting, and burial, which one would nowadays call religious rituals and which modern legal standards regard as situated outside the realm of law. The relations between men, by contrast, typically pertain to the modern concept of law. Islamic legal scholarship, however, limited itself to only a few fields of law: family law, financial transactions, a small number of crimes, and some general rules on arbitration and government. All other fields of law, therefore, were not subject to scholarly scrutiny, but pertained to the realm of worldly rule (sulta).13 The ruler would uphold Sharia on one hand, and promulgate laws according to Berger journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273 242 his own wishes on the other, as long as they were not in violation of the basic tenets of Sharia.
1.2
Modern Applications The second representation of Sharia is its actual practice. In the modern Muslim world, this has taken two forms: either as a code of conduct practiced outside state rule, or as a set of rules of the state legal system.14 Sharia as a code of conduct can be practiced or applied outside the sphere of state rule either within a small communal setting, or in the form of a broader enforcement of such codes by militant groups like the Taliban or isis. This form of Sharia has many different manifestations, ranging from militant and harsh applications to a wide variety of Islamic charity organizations and sustainable development initiatives in the private domain.15
Sharia as legislation is a novelty, dating from the late 19th century, when some domains of Islamic legal scholarship were codified. Because the extensive corpus of Islamic scholarship contained many alternatives and even contradictions, the legislators had to make choices. For example, most Muslim majority countries have codified Islamic family law into a single, national law, but the family laws of, for instance, Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, and Tunisia differ in many respects.16 Since the second half of the 20th century, codification on the basis of Islamic principles has gained popularity in many Muslim countries, but again, within their national contexts. Many typical features of the modern nation state, like a legislature and judiciary, at times combined with a monarchy or a democracy, are maintained within the self-declared Islamic polity, although these institutions have little basis in classical Islamic legal scholarship. The modern interpretations and appearances of Sharia in its social, legal, and constitutional forms are quite unique in the history of Sharia. Although many of these interpretations have become popular in the Muslim world, they are not without criticism. Some critics disagree about the right interpretation of certain rules of Islam, while others argue that modern applications of socalled Sharia are not in conformity with the tenets of Islamic legal scholarship.17
1.3
Slogan Finally, and perhaps most important, is the representation of Sharia as what I suggest to call a slogan.18 The term "Sharia" has a strong and positive reverberation among devout Muslims, irrespective of what Sharia is or how it is applied. Sharia stands for something "good." In this respect, it can be compared to the term "justice," which also stands for something good, even if there is much controversy regarding its exact meaning and application. This is not to say that Sharia is the equivalent of justice, but the slogan mechanism in both instances is similar. Sharia is extremely powerful in this sense: no devout Muslim would disavow Sharia (as has been suggested by some Western politicians as a condition for Muslim integration); and for many Muslims living in poverty or under oppression, Sharia has become a utopian solution.
1.4
Sharia as Lived Practice These three representations refer to the notion of Sharia in general, with a focus on Muslim majority countries. What representations do we encounter when we shift our focus on the manifestation of Sharia in the West? Studying Sharia as either Islamic scholarship or as practices in individual Muslim countries is of little use in answering this question, because neither manifestation reflects or explains the situation and practice of Sharia in the West. Because there is no written code of Sharia, let alone one of Sharia in the West, nor any other comprehensive recording of Sharia jurisprudence or practices in the West, the only approach that may provide us with sufficient answers is Sharia as a lived practice. 
Foreign Law through International Private Law
The second domain where Sharia law is being practiced in a Western context is international private law. National rules of international private law may require a Western national judge to apply a foreign law to a domestic case, or to recognize a foreign legal situation. If such foreign laws or acts are based on Islamic law,28 strictly speaking, the Western court applies Sharia. But if the provisions of these foreign national Sharia laws are considered contrary to fundamental legal principles of a given Western country, the so-called public policy or public order, then such application may be prohibited. Public policy has been invoked in particular in the case of polygamous marriage and unilateral divorce (talaq). For example, in the case of Iranian, Pakistani, or Moroccan nationals in Western countries, the judge of a national Western court must by virtue of the rules of international private law consider the applicability of their Iranian, Pakistani, or Moroccan national family laws. But in the case of polygamy and unilateral divorce, which are valid under these foreign laws, the Western judge may invoke public policy to deny their applicability under the Western jurisdiction.
2.2.3
Informal Legal Practices Informal legal practices make up the third form of Sharia practices in the West. These practices of a legal nature are initiated by individuals, outside state structures or impositions. Examples include Islamic marriages conducted in homes or mosques, private conflict settlement in accordance with Islamic tenets, and the observance of religious rituals. Such informal practices may or may not interact with the domains of national law or international private law. I expect this domain of informal Sharia to gain in importance among Muslims in the West, first, because of the increasing religiousness of the new generations,29 and a corresponding growing wish to live in accordance to the rules of Islam, and second, because Muslim communities are becoming more established in the Western environment. These communities need to handle their religious affairs autonomously, among others, by creating institutional frameworks independent from their countries of origin. As noted, little is known about the precise quantity and quality of these practices and manifestations, because research on this topic is scant. But based on research that has been conducted to date, it is possible to construct a general picture of informal Sharia, as practiced in the West. According to this picture, devout Muslims in the West are committed to living in accordance with Sharia, a commitment limited to the following three domains:
Religious rules, such as those pertaining to prayer, fasting, burial, dietary laws, and dress code (known in Islam as ibadat); 2. Contractual rules relating to family relations (including marriage and divorce), and to financial transactions (known in Islam as mu'amalat); 3. Interactions within the Muslim community and with non-Muslims (including gender issues, political participation, etc.).
Several observations can be made with regard to these three manifestations of Sharia rules. First, these rules do not include domains of Islamic law like criminal law and state law. Second, this collection of rules appears quite random, both in scope and in content. From an Islamic legal-theological perspective, however, there is an internal logic to it, because these rules share a high ranking in the hierarchy of Islamic rules prescribed by classical legal scholarship: they are explicitly mentioned in the Koran, by the Prophet, or by scholarly consensus, and are therefore the first to be followed by any devout Muslim, and the last to be compromised on. In other words, these rules pertain to the essential substance of Islamic religion. The third observation is that according to legal standards of most modern states, only the rules relating to family relations and financial transactions can be considered law or legal rules. The other rules pertain to religious rituals or social conduct, and as such have to do with the individuals' freedom to shape their religion and conduct. From an Islamic perspective, however, all human conduct, whether individual or communal, is governed by Sharia.
Fourth, these domains of Sharia pertain to the daily lives of Muslims, and appear to have little to do with the totalitarian schemes of an Islamic state Berger journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273 248 or with political views on an Islamic restructuring of Western societies. Of course, such views do exist among some radical Muslims, just as there are Muslim extremists who interpret Sharia as a justification to declare their fellow Muslims heretics, or to call for militant action against alleged Western injustices. Although such people are the source of security concerns, the majority of Muslims in the West uphold a much less radical interpretation of Sharia. It must therefore be clear that for each of the three domains of Sharia rules in the West, we must consider that they can be interpreted by Muslims in liberal as well as conservative, and even in extremist ways. For instance, with regard to the interaction with non-Muslims, we can observe a wide array of practices by Muslims, ranging from participation to segregation and from isolation to aggressive rejection. We will discuss this in more detail in Part III below.
(De)constructing Sharia in the West
The preceding paragraphs provided some crude building blocks to construct a notion of Sharia in the West. We have identified the social-legal domains where Sharia in the West is applicable, but we do not yet have a clear view on how it is applied. To do so requires a legal-anthropological approach. Although the theories and methodologies of such an approach are well developed, they have hardly been applied to Sharia,30 and even less so to Sharia in the West.31
We therefore have to tailor-make our own approach.
3.1
The Nature of the Rules To start constructing our model, we must begin by reconsidering the term "Sharia," which we have used consequently until now, but which I find problematic for several reasons. First, we have seen that the term "Sharia" has acquired emotive and ambiguous meanings, both for its supporters and opponents, which may interfere with achieving an unbiased view of its exact meaning and practice. Second, in Islamic legal theory, the term "Sharia" stands for a comprehensive legal-theological system that includes a vast scholarly 30 For such a legal-anthropological approach with regard to Sharia in Muslim-majority countries, see Baudouin Dupret, "La sharî'a comme référent legislative. For the purpose of our model I therefore prefer to use the term "rules of Islam," which I define as the set of religiously motivated rules practised by Muslims in the West. Rules of Islam do not represent an absolute and singular Sharia, but a relative notion that depends on the meaning, interpretation, and practice attributed to Sharia by Muslims. As mentioned, this set of rules is not necessarily equal to that of the legal-theological doctrine developed by classical Islamic scholarship. The next step is therefore to come to a clear understanding of where these rules come from.
3.2
The Production of the Rules Although a Muslim individual or community may state that they practice rules of Islam derived from sacred sources, the approach of our model is that the source, the internal motivation, or the justification of these rules is of little relevance because we are interested only in the manifestation of this rule. Similarly, 32 An-Na'im argued succinctly: "Norms regulating family relations can be religious as long as they are not enforced through state law, but once enforced, they become simply state law rules, regardless of their perceived religious sources" (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, "Religious Norms To do so, I turn to the concept of social groups generating or otherwise living in accordance with internal rules. This phenomenon has been extensively studied and theorized by legal anthropologists.35 Among the many terms they use to describe such groups, the term "social-legal entity"36 has the most relevance for the purposes of this model, as it connotes a non-state social entity (individual, communal, or institutional) that determines what rules it practices and what rules need to be practiced. The relation of these rules to the state is thereby of no relevance. Indeed, some of these communal rules may even be contrary to state rules, as is the case with gang rules and many religious rules. What counts is the normativity of the rules within these groups.
Based on these considerations, I suggest to rewrite the definition of sociallegal entity for our purposes as follows: the term "Muslim" in our model denotes Muslim individuals, communities, and institutions that, as separate or amalgamated entities, practice rules that they consider Islamic. (For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that there are also Muslim groups and communities that do not practice such norms.) 35 For example: Bourdieu ("juridical field:" Pierre Bourdieu, "The Force 
3.3
The Practice of the Rules Having determined what we mean by rules of Islam, and who produces these rules, we now come to how they are being practiced. Generally speaking, adherence to rules requires some kind of enforcing agency that, depending on the nature of the rules, can be of a formal nature, such as police or judge, or of an informal nature, such as one's parents, one's peer-group or the sorority's by-laws. In case of Islamic rules, this enforcing agency may be the individual Muslim (who may invoke God as the ultimate enforcing agent), social peer pressure, the religious authorities, or the state. In Muslim majority countries, we see a mixture of all of these, as Islamic rules have become dispersed across the private and public, social and legal domains. Muslim majority countries have infrastructures of adjudication and consultation, and at times enforcement, either as state institutions (courts, state mufti) or as part of the religious establishment (institutions like al-Azhar in Egypt). However, such infrastructure is lacking or rare in the West (with the exception of South-East European countries), so that Muslims are left to their own devices, whereby the main problem they face is: Who has the authority to interpret, explain, or adjudicate a rule of Islam?37 This explains why so many Muslims in the West refer to Muslim scholars from abroad, and why the Internet plays a prominent role.38
In a Western environment, therefore, the practice of the rules of Islam is basically of an informal nature. with the exception of the few aforementioned cases of international private law and some national law rules. That means that adhering to these rules is voluntary: it is the individual Muslim who decides if and how to apply a rule of Islam, and Muslims effectively become their own muftis.39 This being the case, the individual voluntarism does not do justice to everyday practice: some Muslims are in need of advice regarding the rules, some are in need of adjudication by third parties in conflicts with fellowMuslims (mostly in matters of marriage and divorce), and some feel restrained in their personal practice of rules by peer pressure. I briefly address these three situations below. The first two situations, advice and adjudication, explain the need for authoritative Muslim personalities or institutions in Western societies. To date, it seems that such authority is embodied mostly in individuals like imams or scholars. But we have seen that there are few of them in the West, or at least too few to meet the demand for such authority. And of the few bodies that have been established for this purpose, like the so-called Sharia councils in the uk and the fiqh councils in America, some have received criticism from Muslims for not being representative, or for the pressure that they allegedly exercise, particularly on Muslim women.40
Peer pressure is also the main issue in the third situation: Muslims may feel limited in their freedom to interpret and practice certain rules of Islam, or to not follow rules at all, by social pressure or even coercion by other Muslims, such as peers, family, religiously authoritative figures, or the community. This pressure does not apply exclusively to Muslims: individuals in any society are subject to forms of pressure from their environment. Peer pressure in Muslim communities in the West, however, receives considerable public and political attention, mostly with regard to the position of women.
In some instances, this social pressure can be aggressive. Examples are organizations like Sharia4UK and Sharia4Belgium, which have been known for shouting down public meetings on Islam, or the self-proclaimed "Sharia patrols" that harassed passers-by because their dress or behaviour was considered immoral.41 Although such extremist Muslims are generally known for their hostility toward Western society, their pressure to conform to stringent interpretations of the rules of Islam is exerted mostly on fellow Muslims.
Peer pressure by fellow Muslims may force certain Muslims to submit against their will to rules of Islam, or to rules that they disagree with. But peer pressure may also force Muslims to call upon rules of Islam as an escape strategy. For example, to avoid parental pressure to marry a candidate of their parents' choosing or to stop their studies in order to get married, young Muslim women have been known to invoke certain rules of Islam (this will be further discussed below in Part III). For the purpose of this model, we conclude that the informal practice of Islamic rules in Western societies is not enforced except by the Muslims themselves. Self-enforcement manifests in several forms, including individual voluntary practice and peer pressure. Between these two are the personalities or bodies that can be given sufficient authority by the Muslims communities to exert forms of enforcement.
Conclusion: A Definition of Sharia in a Western Context
Based on these considerations, I define the notion of Sharia in the West as (a) a set of Islam-motivated rules (b) practiced by Muslim social-legal entities (individuals, communities, organizations) in the West, whereby (c) these Muslims are both the defining and the enforcing agency of these rules. The most important conclusion that we can draw from this definition is that Sharia is not something "out there;" it is defined by people through their words and actions. Note that this definition is not intended to elucidate why Muslims do certain things; it merely determines what they do and how they do it. I believe that this is the only way we can come to a clear and objective evaluation of the socalled Sharia in the West. In doing so, we observe that the Muslims in the West are practicing a selective variety of rules of Islam, ranging from prayer and charity, through marriage and dress codes, to interaction with the non-Muslim environment. These rules are subject to numerous theological interpretations and to various forms of practice, ranging from private and friendly to publicly confrontational and even violent. This amalgam of rules, interpretations, and practices is what we call rules of Islam.
By defining Sharia in this way, we avoid the need to determine whether a rule is or is not Islamic. Sharia may be singular in source but not necessarily in outcome, and it is this outcome where our main interest lies. For example, female genital mutilation (fgm) is considered not Islamic by most Muslim religious authorities and by majority consensus in Islamic orthodoxy, but it is practiced on a wide scale in several Muslim majority countries like Egypt and Sudan, where the practitioners consider it to be a rule of Islam. A similar issue arises with violence perpetrated in the name of Islam: to some Muslims, certain situations may justify or even call for violence, but such violence is condemned by others. In these examples, both sides invoke Sharia to justify their actions. Our model operates under the anthropological thesis that people's actions are the determinant factor. From the perspective of Muslim believers, this may be highly frustrating, because they are in need of religious certainty. But the advantage of this approach is that it prevents the observer from becoming mired in discussions about true Islam or real Sharia, and enables him to move on to determining whether a certain action or behavior is acceptable or not, regardless of its religious qualification or justification.
This brings us to the next conclusion, namely that Sharia is a blanket term that needs clarification whenever it is used. Declaring "Sharia" a violation of European values, as stated by the European Court, or banning "Sharia," as has been done in the constitutions of several states in the us, may be justified with regard to its harsh and intolerant forms promoted or practiced by certain people, organizations, or countries. But the presumably unintended result of such unqualified use of the term "Sharia" is that the condemnation encompasses all rules of Islam, including the religious rituals (like prayer, fasting, and burial) and all practices and interpretations that are in conformity with Western values.
Part ii The West
We now come to the second tier of the model in which we identify "the West" and the nature of its responses to the rules of Islam practiced by Muslims in the West.
Defining the West
The notion of "the West" is an oddity at best, as its geographic connotation does not hold when one includes Australia, or Japan, or South Africa, or South America; and its connotation as a value system disqualifies any geographic reference. Nevertheless, its use has become so commonplace, especially in connection with the notion of Sharia, that we cannot circumvent it. For the purpose of this model, I define the West as a geographic region that shares certain histories, features, and values. For the sake of brevity, I refer to three characteristics that stand out. The first is a shared historical heritage that is of European origin, of which the Christian legacy is an important feature.42 42 The Christian legacy is often taken as self-evident, usually referred to by such terms as the "Judeo-Christian civilization." A critical historical analysis is found in Mary Anne Perkins,
Christendom and European Identity, The Legacy of a Grand Narrative since 1789 (2004). For
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The erosion of this religious legacy through a process of secularization is the second characteristic shared by most of the countries belonging to the West. Especially in response to the presence of Islam in Western societies, the notion of secularism is upheld as a key Western value.43 The third characteristic is that in modern times Western countries share certain values that are enshrined in constitutions and conventions, such as political principles (democracy, liberalism, political freedoms) and legal principles (rule of law, constitutional rights, human rights). Within the context of these shared values and legacies, however, there are distinct differences with respect to the experiences with Muslim communities and immigrants in the various Western countries, their political and legal systems, and their attitudes toward religion. In countries in South-Eastern Europe, for instance, Muslims and consequently, the Islamic infrastructure, are a century-old phenomenon, whereas in other Western countries the presence of Muslims is of recent date. Countries may agree on notions like freedom of religion, but interpret it quite differently, which is why the European Court for Human Rights makes use of the notion of "the margin of appreciation."44 And later in this article we will see that Western Europe and the us agree on the notion of secularism as a principal value, but have quite different interpretations on its meaning. These differences, however, are merely the coloring of otherwise common characteristics of the West.
A listing of states that do or do not belong to the West has little relevance to the purpose of our model's analysis. I prefer to use a restricted definition that encompasses only Europe and North America. Others may want to include South America, Australia, and perhaps Russia, Israel, and South Africa. The point, however, is not to focus on individual countries, but to look for certain "Western" commonalities that have a determining influence on responses to the practice of rules of Islam in these societies. Within this myriad of often-conflicting Western reactions, we may discern two general but distinct responses. The first I call the "political-legal response," which corresponds to all norms generated by law and court rulings, and can be paraphrased as "this is how we have organized our society." The second I call the "cultural-religious response," which corresponds to all norms generated by the dominant political, cultural, and social norms shared by the majority of society, and can be paraphrased as "this is how we do things here." These two responses enable us to obtain a comprehensive picture of the West and its interaction with rules of Islam.
2.1
Political-Legal Response Western countries share a system of political and civil liberties and institutions, most of which are enshrined in constitutions and treaties. These include the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and (individual) freedoms. I use the term political-legal response to denote all reactions toward manifestations of rules of Islam that invoke these political and legal values. In our case, we are interested in such responses to the informal practice of rules of Islam. For this, we first need to obtain a better view of the Western political-legal response to religion in general. Although recent publications indicate shifts in the legal paradigm owing to emergent cultural and religious pluralisms,46 45 This paradox has been dubbed "good Sharia - we can discern a few basic features of this response that are of a structural nature.47
The most important of these features is that in Western countries, religion is subordinate to the overall political and legal national structure. Political and legal concepts like freedom of religion and separation of church and state are legal means to regulate the leverage that religion may enjoy in a particular society. Admittedly, countries differ in the elaboration of these fundamental principles. For example, freedom of religion means no state involvement in some countries, while it is upheld in other countries by means of active state support. In the latter case, formal state recognition of a religious community is needed for these communities to establish their theology faculties, to receive funds to pay the salaries of their clergymen, to maintain their places of worship, or otherwise to be recognized as a formal counterpart of the state.
Within these different modalities, religious communities in Western societies have maintained their institutional and legal infrastructure, parallel to that of the state, and are mostly allowed to do so as part of their freedom of religion.48 Consequently, in most Western countries, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox and Jewish communities have established so-called religious tribunals to regulate their religious family affairs autonomously, outside the state legal system. In most Western countries, however, their decisions have no legal power and are to be followed on a voluntary basis, a voluntarism that may be subject to peer or community pressure, as noted above.
2.2
Religious-Cultural Response The proposed model holds that many controversies regarding rules of Islam in Western societies are not of a political-legal nature, but are prompted by societal and cultural objections raised by the dominant normative culture of a particular society. Although such generalizations do not do justice to the heterogeneous and pluralist nature of many Western societies, a strong majority voice has recently emerged in these societies laying claim to "traditional" or "national" values. Insofar as these values are based on local custom, a national tradition or a dominant social order, but not on the national political-legal framework, I refer to them as cultural-religious values. The voice referring to these values is often raised in discussions on pluralism, multiculturalism, and liberties, and is most prominent when it comes to matters of Islam and, in 258 particular, Sharia. This voice is the "religious-cultural response" which, in the absence of any legal or other concrete reference, can best be characterized by "this is the way we do things here." For example, with regard to religion, secularism is often referred to as fundamental to Western societies, and as such in contradiction with the newly arrived public manifestations of Islam in the West.49 I argue, however, that the issue is not secularism, but the cultural tradition of regulating religion. In Europe, the notion of secularism has developed as a dominant public and political culture that is unappreciative of overt manifestations of religiosity. In the us, however, a different tradition of secularism exists, where religion plays a prominent role in the public and political domain.50 Manifestations of religion, by Islam or any other religion, are therefore likely to clash with the European way of handling religion, but less so with the American way. The clash is much less prominent, however, if secularism is defined as a political-legal institution of separating state and religion. It is precisely this separation that is embraced by many European Muslims because it guarantees their freedom to practice their faith according to their own wishes and without state interference. 51 Although European countries take pride in their secularism, in 2005, in the final phase of the European Union Convention working on the "eu Constitution," several European government leaders suggested mentioning in its preamble the European identity as Judeo-Christian.52 The proposed amendment did not come to pass, but it illustrates the frequently emotion-ridden debate concerning the extent to which Islam can be considered part of European civilization and identity.53
3
The Two Responses Applied: West vs. Sharia
The combination of the political-legal and religious-cultural responses helps us make sense of the different, and at times opposing responses to rules of Islam. For example, the law may explicitly allow the building of mosques despite nationwide opposition; or the law does not prescribe that hands need to be shaken when greeting, yet this may be considered an insult by local custom; or, in countries like Kosovo and Albania, wearing the headscarf is not allowed at universities, but it is accepted as part of the national culture of these countries. At times, political-legal and cultural-religious responses concur: interestfree "Islamic" finance is implicitly allowed by law as part of the freedom of contract, and is accepted in most Western countries; at the same time, polygamy is neither allowed by law nor considered acceptable by Western cultures. Based on these examples, we can draw up a matrix that identifies each rule of Islam on the basis of being allowed (or not) by prevailing state law and court rulings, and being accepted (or not) by the dominating normative culture (see table on next page).
This matrix of political-legal and religious-cultural responses is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely illustrative. And granted, this matrix is sketchy and prone to nuance and interpretation: especially the normative aspect of the cultural-religious dimension deserves a more complex answer than a simple yes or no. But the matrix may help us understand Western responses to "Sharia." We see that quite some rules of Islam get two opposing responses from their Western environment: they can be explicitly or implicitly allowed by law, but at the same time not considered acceptable from a cultural or social perspective. This explains the confusion in debates, when the often-heard argument "that is not allowed" implies a legal prohibition, whereas in practice it is based on customary dos and don'ts. The political-legal "that is not allowed" then becomes intermingled with the cultural-religious response "that is not how we do things here." Let us elaborate a few Islamic rules to illustrate this mixture of political-legal and cultural-religious responses. The first example is that of Sharia courts. The only Sharia courts that are part of the national legal system in the West exist in the Greek province of Western Thrace.54 In view of the long-standing presence of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religious tribunals in Western societies, it would appear that from a political-legal point of view an Islamic tribunal should be acceptable. But the cultural-religious response against Islamic tribunals is the dominant one. Note that the arguments against such tribunals are seldom levelled against the religious tribunals of the other religions.55
Another example is the so-called burqa ban, or prohibition against wearing the full-face veil in the public domain. Bills to this effect have been tabled in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain in 2010.56 The bill was not pursued in the Netherlands and Spain, but in France it became law in 2010 and in Belgium in 2011.57 The reasons adduced by the legislators for such a ban were quite diverse, including such political-legal values as equality, freedom, and human dignity, but pertained mostly to cultural-religious values like "rejection of society," "problematic for integration," "burqas are not mentioned in the Quran," 262 "oppression of women," and "disruptive to public order."58 Voices critical of such ban framed their arguments in strictly political-legal terms ( violation of individual autonomy and of equal treatment),59 but the cultural-religious argument appeared more decisive: this is not how we do things here.60 A last example is the ban on "Sharia." We have discussed the views of the European Court of Human Rights on "Sharia" in the Introduction. Several us states went further by prohibiting "Sharia" in its entirety. This started with the "Save our State" amendment in Oklahoma, in 2010.61 Some other states explicitly banned "Sharia law" from being applied by their courts,62 others applied a more general ban on any religious or foreign law, and a third category of states banned foreign laws that do not provide the same protections as us law does.63 Two issues stand out here. First, none of these bills define what they mean by "Sharia." Second, there was no history of problems with Sharia or any Islamic rule in any of these states: "Sharia" appeared to have been conceived not as a practice that needed to be stopped, but to be prevented from ever taking root.64 Although the political-legal response (freedom of religion, rule of law, 58 Berger, supra note 56. For France, see the two proposed bills: Projet de loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public (No. 2520 , 19 May 2010 , 44 Setton Hall Law Review (2014), 659, 685-692. 64 In Oklahoma, 82% of lawmakers and 70% of Oklahoma citizens who voted in favour of the amendment thought it necessary to launch a preemptive strike against any Islamic law infiltrating Oklahoma; Jaron Balou, "Sooners vs. Shari'a: The Constitutional and 264
It appears, therefore, that the power relations between the Western legal system and the rules of Islam represent, in the words of M.B. Hooker, the "dominant" vis-à-vis the "servient" rules.68 Although this point may seem selfevident, it needs emphasis because the issue of Sharia vs. the West is often discussed as if it were a conflict between two equal entities. And that is definitely not the case. The power relations work in favour of the Western legal system. This shows, for instance, in the increasing tendency in Western European countries to "defend" cultural practices by means of legislation, a defense often aimed against rules of Islam, resulting in laws and by-laws concerning dress code (headscarf) or social interaction (shaking hands, burqa). The culturalreligious response is then being transformed into a political-legal response.
5
Security as a Third Response?
The previous paragraph did not address a third, and perhaps the most dominant contemporary response to Sharia, which is the security response. Sharia as such, or in some of its manifestations, is at times perceived as a threat to the legal order, to social cohesion, or to national security in general. The response in this case is not political-legal or religious-cultural, but one of selfpreservation or even self-defense. Is this a third category of Western responses that we need to consider? In my opinion, we do not, because this response is of a different order. The political-legal and cultural-religious responses stem from strongly-held values; security, by contrast, is a self-defense response; it is not a value or based on a value, but rather serves to protect those values. This is not intended to reject such a response; on the contrary, the self-preservation of any nation or society is a factor that drives human behavior. I am, however, more concerned here with providing an analytical tool for the underlying factors (what kind of Sharia are we talking about, and what is the nature of the responses to it from the Western environment) than with the security policies that may or may not follow from such analysis. I therefore leave security considerations out of the model. 
Part iii Responses by Muslims
The model proposed in this article is based on a dialectic: Muslim social-legal entities want to live in accordance with certain rules of Islam, prompting Western legal systems to respond, which in turn creates counter-responses by Muslims. This counter-response is what I will discuss in this last section of the article.
The Effect on Muslims
The cases discussed in the previous section show that most responses to Sharia-related matters are not of a political-legal nature. Indeed, the politicallegal response is often favourable to rules of Islam and their institutionalization, but this seldom is a convincing argument. Manifestations of rules of Islam receive mostly a negative religious-cultural response. The alleged infringement by these rules on religious-cultural values, or its contradiction to such values, is often perceived in such manner that the public or politicians ask for the protection of these values, at times even under the aegis of national security. 
2.3
Adaptation Muslims who adhere to a strict observation of rules of Islam are unwilling to make the slightest adaptation to these rules. But believers with a more liberal inclination may be open to considering the modalities of interpretation. This is where the newly developed scholarship of fiqh al-aqalliyat (Islamic law for minorities) and the notion of maqasid al-Sharia (purposes of Sharia) play important roles.78 A few examples are illustrative: a) A Muslim employee in a fast food restaurant asked whether he was allowed to sell pork sausages. In a fatwa, he was told that as a basic rule selling or handling pork is forbidden and that he should try to make working arrangements to avoid it. If this was not possible, he should find other employment. But if he had no employment alternative, he was told: "you depending on time and circumstance, and it is up to believers to choose the scholarly interpretation that best fits their personal beliefs.
2.4
Conformity Another accommodation to Western responses occurs when the rule of Islam is considered to be in conformity with the corresponding rule in the Western legal system, so that there is no need for a separate invocation or application of that rule of Islam. For example, it has been suggested that if one were to fulfil the conditions of an Islamic marriage (offer and acceptance of marriage in the presence of two male Muslim witnesses)83 when concluding a civil marriage, a separate Islamic marriage is not needed.84
Similarly, it could be argued that a divorce obtained in most Western legal systems is not much unlike an Islamic divorce (talaq): even though the Western divorce is factually pronounced by the judge, both a Western and Islamic divorce are effectively unilateral acts, as the divorce can be obtained by the mere wish of one of the spouses, without any legal conditions. A distinct difference is that in the Western systems both spouses have this unilateral right of divorce while the Islamic talaq is the exclusive right of the husband, but under Islamic law the husband can grant this right to the wife,85 so that the distribution of divorce rights conforms to most Western divorce laws.86
Another example of conformity is international relations and international law, which are considered compatible with Sharia because their mechanics are not different from Sharia or contrary to it. All modern Muslim states make this tacit acknowledgement.87 This logic can be taken further, as was done in Egypt in 1995: when a team of leading Muslim clerics declared that 95% of Egyptian laws were "not in violation" of Sharia, the state declared that this conclusion justified the statement that Egyptian laws were, effectively, Sharia.88 83 The presence of an imam is customary, but not a prerequisite under Islamic law. 84
This position is held, among others, by mufti Ebrahim Deassai; Vit Sisler, "European courts' authority contested? The case of marriage and divorce fatwas on-line", 3 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology (2009), 51, 65-66. 85 This is the cessation (tafwid) of the talaq.
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Strictly speaking, Islamic divorce becomes effective upon its pronunciation by the spouse, whereas in Western laws it is the court that pronounces the divorce. . al-`Ashmawi, al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya wa al-Qanun al-Masri (1996) , 10.
Understanding Sharia in the West journal of law, religion and state 6 (2018) 236-273 2.5 Incompatibility Finally, devout Muslims may concede defeat and acknowledge that certain rules of Islam cannot be applied or observed even if they believe that they should. Rules on gender segregation, for example, cannot be implemented or accommodated by a Western state. Muslims may, however, live in accordance with these rules within the smaller circles of their families or communities, not unlike some orthodox Jewish and Christian communities in the West do.
Strategies
The different ways in which the rules of Islam are being practiced in a setting that we have called "informal legal practices," that is, without any enforcement other than from within the individual or community, imply that they form an intrinsic part of the social dynamics and strategies of Muslim communities. Filing a case against one's husband before a British Sharia council may have no formal legal effect, but the shaming and blaming within the community can produce better results than any court of law.89 Similarly, Muslim girls may circumvent their parents' choice of spouse by presenting them with an Islamic marriage with a partner of the girl's own choice.90 Similar strategies are used when involving the formal legal structure outside the Muslim community. For some Muslims, this may be to assert their identity as a strategy for the "accommodation of difference" (the many headscarf cases raised by Muslims before the courts across Europe are a case in point).91 But such strategies can also be used for opposite ends: litigation before a civil court is being used, mostly by women, to right the wrongs of religious law. A woman whose 'husband' in an informal religious marriage refuses to pay the mandatory dower (mahr), can claim this dower through a civil court by considering this dower civil part of an agreement, and as such as a matter of civil contract law.92 And the Muslim woman who is religiously married may try to persuade the civil court that her husband is committing an act of tort by refusing to 
